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Pornography, Pragmatism and Proscription 
 
 
CLARE McGLYNN
*
 AND IAN WARD
**
 
 
 
Abstract – The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 includes measures 
criminalizing the possession of extreme pornography, namely images of 
bestiality, necrophilia and life-threatening or serious violence. It provides the 
immediate context for this article which seeks to present a pragmatic liberal 
humanist critique of pornography regulation. It is argued that such a critique, 
derived in particular from the writings of Martha Nussbaum and Richard 
Rorty, presents an alternative case for regulation, one which eschews the 
visceral competing fundamentalisms which characterised the „porn-wars‟ of 
the 1980s and 1990s. Whilst moral and epistemological philosophers squabble 
with radical feminists and radical libertarians, extreme pornography can 
nurture real injustice and ruin real lives. A pragmatic liberal humanism 
demands a pragmatic response to extreme pornography. The first part of this 
article will revisit the longer history of the „porn-wars‟ and the 
fundamentalisms which characterised so much of the attendant debate. The 
second will then describe the parameters of a pragmatic liberal humanist 
critique, before examining, in the third part, the shorter history of pornography 
regulation which is written into the provisions now enacted in the 2008 Act. 
 
 
 
The debate regarding the legal regulation of pornography has waxed and waned: 
burning fiercely for much of the 1980s, all but eclipsed for parts of the 1990s.
1
 Today, 
this debate is beginning to sharpen once again, given an immediate impetus by the 
enactment of new provisions in the 2008 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 
designed to criminalize the possession of images of „extreme pornography‟. Such 
regulation, as we shall see, is the subject of considerable vexation, one where the 
intellectual mist rapidly reddens. Of course, few claim that pornographic imagery 
should remain beyond any regulation. There is a line in the sand, a point at which the 
vast majority agree that something must be done; images of child abuse can be found 
at such a point. And once that line is drawn, then the question no longer becomes that 
of whether we should regulate, but simply what should be regulated, how it might be 
best regulated, and how such regulation might be most convincingly justified. The 
purpose of this article is to address, in particular, this latter question. In doing so, it 
will present a distinctive liberal humanist defence of pornography regulation, one 
which draws on the particular writings of Martha Nussbaum and Richard Rorty.  
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1
  For an expression of this sense of weariness, see Alisa Carse, „Pornography: an uncivil 
liberty?‟ (1995) 10 Hypatia 155. 
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1. Pornography: The Clash of Fundamentalisms 
 
A liberal humanist perspective is presented as an alternative to the existing debate 
inherited from the so-called „porn-wars‟ of the 1980s and early 1990s.2 For reasons of 
better comprehension, this debate can be triangulated: a clash of three competing 
fundamentalisms, the moral conservative, the radical feminist, and the classical 
liberal.
3
 We must revisit each in turn, before outlining a liberal humanist approach. 
 
A. Moral Fundamentalism 
 
The first fundamentalism, what Joel Feinberg termed „moralistic paternalism‟, has 
tended to proclaim deep historical roots.
4
 In the popular perception, it is often 
associated with Victorian „values‟; even though, as Lisa Sigel has recently confirmed, 
pornographic imagery was just as commonly found in the mid-nineteenth century 
gentleman‟s drawing room as it is today.5 More often than not moral fundamentalism 
also imports a theological charge. Notably, many of the more strident contributions to 
the consultation process which accompanied the drafting of the extreme pornography 
provisions in the 2008 Act came from Christian interest groups. The Lawyers‟ 
Christian Fellowship, for example, suggested that „all forms of pornographic material‟ 
were a „serious problem‟ because it „encourages a distorted and selfish view of 
sexuality‟ which „divorces sex from love and tenderness‟.6 Familiar jurisprudential 
expressions of this theologically-grounded moralism can be found in texts such as 
Patrick Devlin‟s commentary on the 1957 Wolfenden Report, The Enforcement of 
Morals.
7
 According to Devlin, English law was „inextricably joined‟ to questions of 
morality and faith, so much so that „without the help of Christian teaching the law will 
fail‟. The purpose of criminal law is to address the ravages of „sin‟, and in so doing 
maintain the authority of the „right-minded man‟. Respect for „common morality‟, in 
sum, is the „price‟ paid by a civilized society.8 And sexual promiscuity, however it is 
displayed, represents a particular threat to such a society.
9
 There was nothing shy 
about Devlin‟s invocation of what he perceived to be a distinctively English „legal 
moralism‟, as Herbert Hart described it.10 
 
                                                 
2
  For an earlier plea to move beyond the „stark dichotomous choice‟ which the porn-wars 
presented, see Emily Jackson, „The Problem with Pornography: A Critical Survey of the Current 
Debate‟ (1995) 3 Feminist Legal Studies 49. 
3
  The same essential triangulation was noted by Jackson, above n 2, at 51-2. For the supposition 
that there is here a clash of „fundamental‟ political and jurisprudential principles, see Ishani Maitra and 
Mary Kate McGowan, „The Limits of Free Speech: Pornography and the Question of Coverage‟ (2007) 
13 Legal Theory 42. 
4
  Joel Feinberg, „Pornography and the Criminal Law‟, in David Copp and Susan Wendell (eds) 
Pornography and Censorship (New York: Prometheus, 1983), 133. 
5
  See Lisa Sigel, Governing Pleasures: Pornography and Social Change in England 1815-
1914, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002) 1-13 and also Mary McIntosh, „Liberalism 
and the contradictions of Sexual Politics‟, in Lynne Segal and Mary McIntosh (eds) Sex Exposed: 
Sexuality and the Pornography Debate (London: Virago, 1992) 165. 
6
  Quoted in Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, „Striking a Balance: Arguments for the 
Criminal Regulation of Extreme Pornography‟ [2007] Sept Criminal Law Review 677, at 682. 
7
  Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
8
  Devlin, above n 7, 4-5, 9, 23-5. 
9
  Devlin, above n 7, 62-3. 
10
  Herbert Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968) 4-6. 
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This morality finds a more immediate juristic expression, of course, in the 
existing provisions of the 1959 Obscene Publications Act which, until the enactment 
of the 2008 Act, was the primary statutory mechanism for regulating adult 
pornography. Section 1 of the 1959 Act defines „obscene‟ material as that which may 
tend to „deprave or corrupt‟ the consumer. This specific terminology has a particular 
historical resonance, finding an original expression in Lord Cockburn‟s proscription 
of material which contained „thoughts of the most impure and libidinous kind‟ in 
Hicklin in 1868.
11
 A century later, as Susan Edwards has confirmed, English courts 
continue, in such cases, to presume that the test of obscenity is set by received 
perceptions of morality and immorality.
12
 Consumers, as the court confirmed in the 
notorious Whyte case in 1972, must be protected from themselves.
13
 
 
A generation after Devlin, conservative fundamentalism finds a more 
confident expression amongst communitarian theorists, particularly in the US. Amitai 
Etzioni‟s The Spirit of Community was intended to address the „increasing moral 
confusion and social anarchy‟ which had taken possession of fin-de-siecle America.14 
Other communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre shied away from overt moralising. 
Etzioni did not. The future well-being of America, he declared, depended on the 
reassertion of private „morality‟ and public „moral voice‟.15 And like Devlin, Etzioni 
identified loose sexual morality, including the lax regulation of pornography, as a 
peculiar threat.
16
 Likewise addressing the particular instance of pornography, a rather 
more cautious Michael Sandel could still argue that the cause of the „common good‟ 
might justifiably demand enhanced regulation. There is nothing particularly noble, he 
confirmed, in a pointed rejoinder to liberal critics, in defending the offensive.
17
 
 
In the UK, the transient advance of „third way‟ politics represented a rather 
paler imitation. But if the advocacy of moral fundamentalism was here rather harder 
to discern, at least in academic circles, there was no such reticence amongst 
politicians, especially those who associated themselves with the crusading zeal of 
Blairite New Labour. In part this zeal was bred of a desire to detach „new‟ Labour 
from the presumed stigma of association which aligned „old‟ Labour and the 
„permissive society‟. In part, too, it could be identified as part of a more personal, and 
intensely theological, mission pursued by the leader of New Labour, Prime Minister 
Blair.
18
 
 
Such moralism was apparent in government briefings which attended the 
passage of the 2008 Act. One Home Office minister simply declaimed images of 
extreme pornography to be „extremely offensive to the vast majority of people‟.19 In 
                                                 
11
  R v Hicklin (1868) LR 3 QB 360, at 371.  
12
  See Susan Edwards, „On the Contemporary Application of the Obscene Publications Act 
1959‟ [1998] Criminal Law Review 849. 
13
  Whyte v DPP [1972] AC 849. 
14
  Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian 
Agenda, (London: Fontana, 1995). 
15
  Etzioni, above n 14, ix-xi, 12. 
16
  Etzioni, above n 14, 198-9. 
17
  Michael Sandel, „Morality and the Liberal Ideal‟ (1984) 190 New Republic May 15-17. 
18
  See generally Julian Petley, „New Labour, Old Morality‟, Index on Censorhip 02 2007, 132-6. 
19
  Paul Goggins, quoted in Home Office Press Release, „Crackdown on Violent Pornography‟, 
31 August 2005, available at: http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-
releases/Crackdown_On_Violent_Pornography?version=1 [last visited 18 February 2009]. 
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its response to the 2005 consultation paper, the Conservative Party likewise 
denounced the portrayal of sexual activity that was „depraved and corrupting‟.20 The 
same tone could be clearly heard in parliamentary debate. Justice Secretary Jack 
Straw expressed himself repelled by such „vile‟ imagery. Martin Salter MP railed 
against images that were „obscene and disturbing‟, adding „If people want to do weird 
things to each other, they still can, but I say “don‟t put it on the internet”‟. Charles 
Walker MP weighed in with a personal dislike of „nasty and unpleasant stuff‟.21 
Parliament is, of course, the last place to look for nuanced intellectual debate. But the 
sentiment, all the same, was clearly audible. It was altogether more conservative than 
liberal, and in its invariable desire to promote particular norms of non-corrupting 
sexual behaviour, presumed a moral charge.  
 
Of course, one critical feature of these utterances is immediately notable: their 
lack of precision. What is pornographic and what is not? The question is one which 
exercises anyone who engages with the subject, including, as we shall see, anti-
pornography feminists.
22
 But this critical indeterminacy tends to haunt moral 
fundamentalists all the more. Liberals argue against regulation, in part, because 
pornography cannot be defined, at least not absolutely. Richard Posner, a rather 
different liberal it must be admitted, makes precisely this argument.
23
 On its face the 
argument has some strength. Should we seek to criminalise people who enjoy 
something we cannot even define? Justice Stevens‟s observations in the Jacobellis 
case are notorious. Declining to attempt a definition, because he „could never succeed 
in intelligibly doing so‟, Stevens nevertheless concluded „I know it when I see it‟.24 
Practical perhaps; but not on its face terribly helpful, especially to a moral 
fundamentalist. It hardly helps the cause of proscription if no one can define for sure 
what it is they hope to proscribe. Ultimately, it is this indelible contingency, political, 
social and cultural, as well as textual, which fatally undermines the grander 
intellectual pretensions of moral fundamentalism.  
 
B. Feminist Fundamentalism 
 
The uncompromising tone of moral fundamentalism finds a resonance in the 
competing claims made by radical anti-pornography feminists. Andrea Dworkin 
articulated a famously categorical tone, suggesting that all pornography confirms that 
„male pleasure is inextricably tied to victimizing, hurting, exploiting; that sexual fun 
and passion in the privacy of the male imagination are inseparable from the brutality 
of male history‟.25 Catharine MacKinnon agreed: pornography is a totem of endemic 
„female sexual slavery‟.26 The potential reach of regulation imputed by this 
fundamentalism found an equally famous expression in the anti-pornography 
Ordinances crafted by Dworkin and MacKinnon.
27
 The Ordinances intended to create 
                                                 
20
  Quoted in McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6, at 682. 
21
  See variously, Hansard, 8/10/2007, cols.60, 92-3, 113, 117. 
22
  See Jackson, above n 2, at 49, noting that a „precise definition is difficult, perhaps even 
impossible‟. 
23
  See his Sex and Reason (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994) 381-2. 
24
  Jacobellis v Ohio (1964) 378 US, 197. 
25
  Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: men possessing women (London: Women‟s Press, 1981) 224. 
26
  Catharine MacKinnon, Women’s Lives: men’s laws (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2005) 301. 
27
  The Ordinance text can be found in MacKinnon, above n 26, at 493-7, with further details at 
359-72. It can also be accessed at:  
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a civil claim for damages against producers and distributors of pornography. Whilst 
the Supreme Court eventually affirmed their unconstitutionality in Hudnut, as being 
contrary to the First Amendment, the strategic value of the proposed Ordinances was 
considerable; bringing to the fore of public debate the potential, intensely gendered, 
harms which pornographic images might promote.
28
 
 
The evolution of feminist fundamentalism has a dual aspect; one associated 
with the vexed issue of causal harm, the other with conceptual notions of objectivity. 
In the case of the former, it is argued that pornographic images, especially those 
which portray sexualised violence, inspire men to commit acts of sexual assault. The 
Minneapolis hearings, which prefaced the Dworkin-MacKinnon Ordinance, heard 
much testimony which confirmed the possibility of a causal link between 
pornography and sexual violence. For the „first time in history‟, MacKinnon insisted, 
women, more particularly those trapped in the sex industry, „spoke to the harms done 
to them through pornography‟. For those who had somehow „survived pornography, 
the hearings were like coming up for air‟. Central to MacKinnon‟s thesis is the 
asserted link between pornography and rape; „porn is the theory, rape is the 
practice‟.29 The supposition clearly presumes a causal association, and finds support 
elsewhere. It was imputed in the conclusions to the Meese Commission, and has been 
more recently affirmed in a 2007 Home Office report on the subject which found 
„evidence of some harmful effects from extreme pornography on some who access 
it‟.30  
 
However, the problem with the causation argument is that it remains difficult 
to prove; or at least easy for the liberal fundamentalist to reject.
31
 The evidence might, 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/other/ordinance/newday/AppA.htm [last visited 17 
February 2009]. 
28
  The Supreme Court agreeing that they breached the First Amendment. American Booksellers v 
Hudnut 771 F.2d.323 (7
th
 Cir.1985) affirmed in Hudnut v American Booksellers 106 Sup.Ct.1172 
(1986). The influence of the debates on US public opinion was considerable. It also spread across the 
border into Canada, exercising a notable influence on the crafting of Canadian obscenity legislation. 
See further Bret Boyce, „Obscenity and Community Standards‟ (2008) 33 Yale Journal of International 
Law 299. In addition, the legacy of the MacKinnon/Dworkin approach to pornography can be seen in 
many of the feminist responses to the Government‟s 2005 consultation on extreme pornography, as 
discussed in McGlynn and Rackey, above n 6 at 681-682 and further below. 
29
  Catharine MacKinnon , „The Roar on the Other Side of Silence‟, in Catharine MacKinnon and 
Andrea Dworkin (eds) In Harm’s Way: The Pornography-Civil Rights Hearings (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1997) 17. 
30
  See, respectively, Attorney General‟s Commission on Pornography (Meese Commission) 
(1986), available at: http://www.porn-report.com/ and Catherine Itzin, Anne Taket and Liz Kelly, The 
Evidence of Harm to Adults Relating to Exposure to Extreme Pornographic Material: a rapid evidence 
assessment, (Ministry of Justice Research Series 10-07, 2007), at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/280907.pdf [both last visited 17 February 2009]. The Ministry of 
Justice report further confirmed that the effects were likely to be greater on „men predisposed to 
aggression‟ or who have a „history or sexual or other aggression‟ (at iii). The authors concluded that 
their research represented a „significant step in clarifying the position in an area subject to previous 
academic dispute about the findings of specific studies‟ (at v).  
31
  See, for example, James Weinstein, Hate Speech, Pornography and the Radical Attack on 
Free Speech Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999) 132, asserting that data might incline towards a 
possible link, but as yet „no confident conclusions can be drawn‟. Posner also uses the same argument 
in his Sex and Reason, above n 23, at 370-1. An early and authoritative critique of the possibility of a 
sufficient causal link can be found in Joel Feinberg, above n 4, at 105-37. The broader jurisprudential 
debate regarding the possibilities of establishing causal harm in criminal law is vast. For recent 
expressions, see Andrew von Hirsch, „Extending the Harm Principle: Remote Harms and Fair 
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at best, be „suggestive‟, but it is not „alone dispositive‟.32 For this reason, many 
feminists reject reliance on causation arguments. Karen Boyle, for example, argues 
that linking a feminist case against pornography to „flawed effects research‟ has 
„significantly damaged‟ the feminist anti-pornography argument.33 Drucilla Cornell 
similarly questions the strategic value of alleging causal linkage. The impact of 
pornography, she observes, is anyway likely to be various, any harm as readily 
allusive as immediate.
34
 For this reason, Robyn Eckersley advocates a 
reconceptualisation of the harm of pornography, conceiving of it as a „signifying 
practice‟ which shares „many characteristics with other more everyday representations 
of women‟.35 Such an approach, marrying textual sophistication with a more 
pragmatic concern with the varieties of women‟s experiences, reaches towards the 
kind of liberal humanism which we will advance shortly. 
 
The second aspect of this radical feminist argument centres on 
„objectification‟ and the constitutive capacity of pornography. Here pornography is an 
act, rather than mere speech; a series of „institutions and practices‟ which „constitute‟ 
rather than simply express „the ideas they embody‟.36 The claim is that pornography 
enshrines a particular, degraded image of women; it defines them in a peculiarly 
sexualised way, and in doing so denies their humanity. Rae Langton makes this 
argument
37
, though it finds original expression in MacKinnon, most strikingly in Only 
Words: „Pornography is not restricted here because of what it says. It is restricted 
because of what it does‟. 38 The harm is immediate, quite literally apparent, and in no 
need of anecdotal or other reinforcement. It is part of what critical legal scholars, 
echoing early twentieth century phenomenologists, term the „lived experience‟ of 
being female.
39
 Such an imposition, the construction of a particular image of women 
by pornography, it has been further argued, can itself be construed as an infringement 
of an alternative right to equality.
40
 For obvious reasons, the resonance between the 
thesis presented in Only Words and the „speech act‟ theories of Austin and Searle has 
                                                                                                                                            
Imputation‟, in Andrew Simester and ATH Smith (eds) Harm and Culpability (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 259-76; Andrew Simester and Andrew von Hirsch, „Rethinking the Offence 
Principle‟ (2002) 8 Legal Theory 269 and Dennis Baker, „The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote 
Harms‟ (2007) 10 New Criminal Law Review 370. 
32
  Cass Sunstein, „Pornography and the First Amendment‟ (1986) Duke Law Journal 589, at 
600. 
33
  Karen Boyle, „The Pornography Debates: beyond cause and effect‟ (2000) 23 Women’s 
Studies International Forum 187, at 187. 
34
  Drucilla Cornell, The Imaginary Domain (London: Routledge, 1995) 101. 
35
  Robin Eckersley, „Whither the Feminist Campaign: an evaluation of feminist critiques of 
pornography‟ (1987) 15 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 164. 
36
  Catharine MacKinnon, Only Words (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993) 11-13. 
For an overview of the broader argument, see Cynthia Stark, „Is Pornography an Action? The Causal v 
the Conceptual View of Pornography‟s Harm‟ (1997) 23 Social Theory and Practice 277. 
37
  See Rae Langton, „Speech acts and unspeakable acts‟ (1993) 22 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
293. 
38
  See MacKinnon, above n 37, at 23, and see especially 3-6 for an eloquent expression of the 
essential thesis. For critical commentaries, see Laurie Shrage, „Exposing the Fallacies of Anti-Porn 
Feminism‟ (2005) 6 Feminist Theory 45, at 46-51 and also Mary Kate McGowan, „On Pornography: 
MacKinnon, Speech Acts and “False” Construction‟ (2005) 20 Hypatia 21. 
39
  See Clyde Willis, „The Phenomenology of Pornography: A Comment on Catharine 
MacKinnon‟s Only Words‟ (1997) 16 Law and Philosophy 177, 181-5. 
40
  See here Rae Langton, „Whose Right? Ronald Dworkin, Women, and Pornographers‟ (1990) 
19 Philosophy and Public Affairs 311, at 337-49. 
Published in (2009) 36(3) Journal of Law and Society 327-351 
 
 7 
been frequently explored.
41
 The possibility that a kind of speech can construct a 
harmful act, in a general as opposed to particular instance, however, remains hotly 
contested.
42
 Further, as with causation arguments, it is ultimately futile in its attempts 
to persuade those in conflict with this fundamentalist position.  
 
Nonetheless, while being fundamentalist, the radical feminist anti-
pornography arguments „reoriented‟ pornography debates, as Martha Nussbaum 
explains, away from „alleged disgustingness‟ to „issues of equality, subordination and 
associated harms and damages‟.43 In the short term, however, the coincidence of 
strategic interest between moral and feminist fundamentalism, which became apparent 
during the US Meese Commission hearings in the early 1980s, generated considerable 
disquiet. Conservatives, as Robin West noted, worry about God, virtue and 
maintaining the status quo; anti-pornography feminists about women being raped.
44
 
Violence is the key differential. For this reason, David Dyzenhaus suggests that 
feminists opposing the proliferation of pornography would find better „allies‟ in those 
liberals who argue  for a „rich‟ conception of harm and equality.45 
 
In the longer term, other feminists, in response to the fundamentalism of the 
radical anti-pornography approach, began to articulate a more nuanced approach to 
pornography. Robin West eloquently suggested that women‟s experiences of 
pornography are variable; much of it is regressive and degrading, but some may be 
positive, even „life-affirming‟.46 Less inclined to embrace nuance was Wendy 
McElroy. Pornography, McElroy baldly affirmed, „benefits women, both personally 
and politically‟.47 While this declaration has tendencies towards fundamentalism of its 
own, it highlights the divergence in feminist approaches to the regulation and 
consumption of pornography. For this reason, the instantiation of a feminist position 
against pornography, a feminist fundamentalism indeed, must be resisted.
48
   
 
C. Liberal Fundamentalism 
 
A third fundamentalism, ranged against both conservative and feminist alike, is rooted 
in classical liberal jurisprudence. Once again, it could be heard, albeit in often rather 
                                                 
41
  John L. Austin, How to do Things with Words, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) and John 
Searle, Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992). 
42
  For a critical view, see Jennifer Saul, „Pornography, Speech Acts and Context‟ (2006) 106 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 227, at 229-48, concluding that a „speech act‟ as understood by 
an Austinian only makes sense in particular contexts, and cannot be strategically deployed to bolster a 
more general, necessarily more abstract, argument. The „best one can do‟, accordingly, „is to claim that 
pornographic viewings are sometimes the subordination of women‟. Similarly sceptical is Mary Kate 
McGowan, above n 38, 43-6. 
43
  Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: a classical defense of reform in liberal education  
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1997) 141. 
44
  Robin West, „The Feminist-Conservative Anti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney-
General‟s Commission on Pornography Report‟ (1987) 12 American Bar Foundation Research Journal  
681, at 700-7. 
45
  David Dyzenhaus, „John Stuart Mill and the Harm of Pornography‟ (1992) 102 Ethics 534, at 
551. 
46
  Above n 44, at 693 and 709-11.  
47
  Wendy McElroy, XXX: a woman’s right to pornography (New York: St Martin‟s Press, 
1995), p viii. 
48
  Drucilla Cornell made the same argument, for a more sensitive appreciation of differential 
experiences of pornography, in The Imaginary Domain, above n 34, particularly at 95-6 and 162-3. See 
also Shrage, above n 38. 
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corrupted form, in the months preceding the 2008 Act; most immediately in arresting 
aspersions of pending moral and intellectual despotism.
49
 There is a rather more sober 
and more rigorous side to liberal fundamentalism of course; one that has enjoyed 
considerable intellectual influence over recent decades.
50
 And it too often proclaims a 
historical root, most commonly invoking the canonical writings of John Stuart Mill, 
and latter Millians such as Isaiah Berlin.
51
  
 
The bit of Mill that liberal fundamentalists like to cite is the so-called „Harm 
Principle‟. If finds famous expression in Mill‟s essay On Liberty: „That the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others‟.52 The liberal 
fundamentalist prefers a strict interpretation of Mill‟s Principle, proclaiming that, in 
the absence of clear evidence of physical, or perhaps even mental, harm, legislative 
regulation of individual behaviour is unwarranted. In fact, whilst a simplistic 
sequestration of the „Harm Principle‟ might be deployed against the regulation of 
milder forms of sexual imagery, it is quite possible that the revered hero of liberal 
fundamentalism would have strode very happily through the government lobbies 
when it came to passing legislation criminalizing extreme pornography. A closer 
reading of The Subjection of Women, as David Dyzenhaus has suggested, reveals a 
Mill who would have been exercised in the extreme by the supposition that his essay 
„on liberty‟ should be used to institutionalise the cultural degradation and 
jurisprudential inequality of women.
53
  
 
The current champion of liberal fundamentalism is Ronald Dworkin. In a 
succession of essays on the subject, Dworkin has repeatedly argued against the 
principle of regulation. This is part of a broader defence of individual liberties against 
the temptations of intrusive government, cast strategically in terms of a corresponding 
enhancement of individual „moral responsibility‟.54 Realising that the increasingly 
arcane tenets of moral fundamentalism might be swatted away with relative ease, 
Dworkin has focussed instead on the particular challenges of radical feminism.
55
 To 
this end he has repeatedly argued two things. First, is the mantra that there is no 
                                                 
49
  The Campaign Against Censorship, for example, insinuated that all manner of literary and 
textual canon might fall victim to the pending legislation, including Leda the Swan and The Rape of 
Europa: see McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6, at 684-5. Of course, such proscription was never 
possible, and indeed specifically excluded by the requirement for explicit and realistic depictions (see 
further below). But, as the pulses race, the temptations to exaggerate can be irresistible. 
50
  For this influence, see Jackson, above n 2, at 53. 
51
  For a strong anti-regulation statement, founded on what he terms the „Millian principle‟, see 
Thomas Scanlon, „A Theory of Freedom of Expression‟ (1972) 1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 204. 
For a comment on Mill‟s ubiquity in this context, see Susan Easton, The Problem of Pornography: 
regulation and the right to free speech (London: Routledge, 1994) 1-3. 
52
  John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: Penguin, 1985) 68. 
53
  See David Dyzenhaus, above n 45. Dyzenhaus‟s highly original supposition generated 
considerable critical comment. For a sceptical rejoinder, see Robert Skipper, „Mill and Pornography‟ 
(1993) 103 Ethics 726. For a more supportive re-iteration, refuting the fundamentalist „myth‟ of the 
Harm Principle, see Richard Vernon, „John Stuart Mill and Pornography: Beyond the Harm Principle‟ 
(1996) 102 Ethics 621. The same argument is made by Susan Easton, above n 52, at 1-9 and also 52-7. 
54
  For a crisp statement, see Ronald Dworkin, „The Coming Battles Over Freedom of Speech‟, 
New York Review of Books 11/6/1992, 56-7. 
55
  See his comments, specifically directed at MacKinnon, in Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: 
The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 227-8. 
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compelling evidence of causal harm.
56
 Second, is the collateral argument that, 
regardless of any possible utility, as a matter of policy, regulation of pornography can 
have a „chilling effect‟ on the broader jurisprudential culture of free expression.57  
 
For Dworkin, famously, rights are „trumps‟ over moral and „goal-based‟ 
arguments; no matter how great or loud the weight of popular opinion in their 
support.
58
 A vague sense of „disgust‟, even a strong sense of abhorrence, of the kind 
which is more overtly articulated by moral fundamentalists, but which, Dworkin 
infers, lurks behind the rhetoric of all pro-regulation anti-pornographers, is never 
enough to justify legislative intervention.
59
 Two such rights are invariably presented; 
a right to freedom of expression and a right to privacy. The former, in particular, is 
„valuable‟ not just „in virtue of the consequences it has‟ but because it is an „essential 
and constitutive feature of a just political society‟.60 The idea that pornography might 
inhibit the free participation of women in such a society is dismissed as „instrumental‟ 
and derivative, a perversion of Berlin‟s idea of „positive liberty‟, and its countenance 
in various jurisdictions „ominous for liberty and for democracy‟, and suggesting of 
incipient „tyranny‟.61 Of course, the realm of „right‟ is not conceptually uncontested, 
just as the meaning of „speech‟ remains a matter of some dispute.62 
 
 
2. Pragmatism: A Liberal Humanist Critique  
 
                                                 
56
  For a critique of the often rather scanty nature of this dismissal, see Langton, above n 41, at 
327. For the strength of this view, and its hold on academic and popular opinion, see Easton, above n 
52, at 32-3. 
57
  For an invocation of this effect, see Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985) 348 and also Freedom, above n 55, at 221. The same fear is articulated by 
Feinberg, above n 4, at 112. For a sceptical dismissal of this rather simplistic leap of the juristic 
imagination, see Danny Scoccia, „Can Liberals Support a Ban on Violent Pornography? (1996) 106 
Ethics 776, at 797-8. Deploying a different metaphor, Susan Easton recasts the „chilling effect‟ 
argument as the „slippery slope‟ argument, see above n 51, at 65-78. 
58
  See, for example, his comments in Principle, above n 57, particularly at 353-65, written in the 
immediate context of the Williams‟ Commission (Bernard Williams, Report of the Committee on 
Obscenity and Film Censorship, Cmnd 7772, London: HMSO, 1979) which entertained a variety of 
policy-based arguments for regulation. As we shall see in due course, in the final analysis, the 
Commission rejected virtually all such argumentation. But Dworkin remained critical of the 
Commission‟s willingness even to countenance such arguments in the first place. 
59
  For an early dismissal of arguments from moral „taste‟, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977) 257-8. For a re-assertion, see his comments in Freedom, above n 
55, at 233-4 and also 238, concluding that „we cannot count, among the kinds of interests that may be 
protected in this way, a right not to be insulted or damaged just by the fact that others have hostile or 
uncongenial tastes, or that they are free to express or indulge them in private‟. 
60
  Dworkin, Freedom, above n 55, at 200-1, citing Mill, once more, as an ultimate authority for 
this view. 
61
  Dworkin, Freedom, above n 55, at 205-7, 219-23 and 239. Given his caustic criticism of 
MacKinnon for deploying rhetorical vaguery in the place of cogent argument, Dworkin‟s raising the 
spectre of pending „tyranny‟ has its own ironies. For his accusation of „breathtaking hyperbole‟, see 
Dworkin‟s review of Only Words, republished in Freedom, above n 55, at 230-1. 
62
  See Langton, „Whose Right?‟, above n 40, at 311-12, Sunstein, above n 32, at 625-6 and also 
Stark, above n 36, at 277 making this concession. Dworkin also readily concedes the need for 
„exceptions‟, but determines to maintain a high-line in permitting such exceptions, and remains 
resolutely opposed, as a matter of principle, to the idea that pornography might be recognised as one. 
For a discussion of „exceptions‟, see Freedom, above n 55, at 209-11. 
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Classical liberalism tends to pervade modern jurisprudence textbooks; think 
liberalism, think autonomy, think rights. It brooks no compromise. Neither, of course, 
do its rival fundamentalisms, the moral and the radical feminist. But such 
intransigence does few any favours and, for this simple reason, the case for crafting 
alternative approaches is compelling. The purpose of this section is to present such an 
alternative, one which, drawing most immediately on the writings of Martha 
Nussbaum and Richard Rorty, can be termed liberal humanist. Such a liberalism, 
driven primarily by a desire to craft a political morality that is both ethical in its 
conception and pragmatic in its application, will help us to make sense of the 
provisions recently enacted in the 2008 Act, whilst also perhaps reconciling us to their 
limitations. This idea of reconciliation, of accepting the virtue of contingency, and 
relishing it, is central to both aspirations of the liberal humanist; the desire to retrieve 
an ethics and the desire to make it credible. But before we focus more closely on this 
particular virtue, we must first take a closer look at what a liberal humanist ethics 
might look like.  
 
Ethics lies at the heart of Nussbaum‟s intellectual enterprise; rather more so 
perhaps than Rorty who remained famously sceptical of the lure of „comprehensive‟ 
theories. Nussbaum‟s desire to reaffirm a conception of the „good‟, as an exercise in 
„practical wisdom‟, is overtly Aristotelian.63 We will explore the pragmatic 
implications of this  conception in due course. Suffice to say, for Nussbaum a 
„practical wisdom‟ is one that is devoted to particularity, to setting the parameters of 
the good in relation to the alternative interests of particular individuals. It is for this 
reason that Nussbaum is so anxious that a liberal humanist ethics should be driven by 
a concern for the fate of others. An „intelligent‟ liberal citizenship, as she 
recommended in Cultivating Humanity: 
 
[M]eans the ability to think what it might be like to be in the shoes of a person different from 
oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person‟s story, and to understand the emotions and 
wishes and desires that someone so placed might have.
64
 
 
Such a conception of citizenship imports two other key characteristics. First, it is 
concerned with feelings, with the faculty of sensibility as much as the faculty of 
reason. Morality and emotion „support and inform one another‟.65 The latter softens 
the edges of the former, instantiating a critical sense of the particular against the 
temptations of dogmatic fundamentalism. It is for this reason that a democratic 
society needs „leaders‟, and it might be added jurists, „whose hearts and imaginations 
acknowledge the humanity in human beings‟.66  
 
This same sentiment can be found in Rorty‟s description of the liberal 
„ironist‟, as compared with the metaphysical:  
 
The liberal metaphysician wants our wish to be kind to be bolstered by an argument, one 
which entails a self-redescription which will highlight a common human essence, an essence 
which is something more than our shared ability to suffer humiliation. The liberal ironist just 
                                                 
63
  The ambition is strongly, and repeatedly, confirmed in Nussbaum‟s, Love’s Knowledge: 
Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). For explicit affirmation, 
see 18, 36-44, 72-3. 
64
  Nussbaum, Humanity, above n 43, at 10-11. 
65
  Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, at 53. 
66
  Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, at 101. 
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wants our chances of being kind, of avoiding the humiliation of others, to be expanded by 
redescription. She thinks that recognition of a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only 
social bond that is needed.
67
 
 
Rorty‟s rejection of what he termed „comprehensive‟ moral philosophy was, of 
course, notorious. The idea of a „necessary truth‟ is merely a „proposition‟ which 
enjoys a momentary „hold‟ on our political imagination. There are instead merely 
various historically contingent „attempts to solve problems‟.68 Rorty‟s is an ethics 
written „without the ought‟.69 Of course, such an ethics asks considerable questions of 
liberal jurisprudence. According to Rorty, to say something is right or wrong, just or 
unjust, is merely to say that it does or does not conform to current social practice.
70
 
For this reason, in practical terms the cause of justice would be altogether better 
served if jurists worried less about abstract rights and rather more about real harm and 
suffering. Justice is a „practical goal‟, not a piece of juristic whimsy, the construct of 
individuals addressing „small contingent facts‟ rather than paying obeisance to „large 
necessary truths‟.71 The dismissal of rights-theory as a debilitating distraction, the 
primary theme of his seminal 1993 Amnesty Lecture, attracted a splenetic response 
from liberal fundamentalists such as Ronald Dworkin.
72
 But Rorty was unbowed. The 
aspiration of social justice, he later affirmed, will only be realised when „talk of 
fraternity and usefulness has replaced talk of rights‟.73 Nussbaum is perhaps a little 
less abrasive, prepared to admit that a theory of rights may have a necessary role in a 
modern democracy.
74
 But, like Rorty, she is not prepared to allow a wedded fetish for 
rights and reason to diminish the place of „dignity‟, or the faculty of compassion, as a 
vital component of a liberal humanist ethics.
75
 The implications for her more 
concentrated critique of pornography and legal regulation, to which we shall turn 
shortly, are considerable. 
 
The second defining quality of a liberal humanist ethics is that it is literate. 
Here Nussbaum and Rorty are in close agreement. In her short essay on the relation of 
literature and law, Poetic Justice, Nussbaum opened with a defence of the „literary 
imagination precisely because it seems to me an essential ingredient of an ethical 
stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the good of other people whose lives are 
                                                 
67
  Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 91. Emphasis in original. 
68
  See Richard Rorty, The Consequences of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester, 1982) 16 and also 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 157. For a 
commentary on this position, see Alan Malachowski, Richard Rorty (Chesham: Acumen, 2002) 3-6. 
69
  Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 305. 
70
  Richard Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 47. 
71
  Rorty, „Contingency‟, above n 67, at 198. 
72
  The lecture, „Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality‟, is republished as chapter 9 of 
Truth and Progress, above n 69. The critique of rights as a strategy of „dehumanization‟ is at 177-80. 
For Dworkin‟s exchange with Rorty, see Ronald Dworkin, „Pragmatism, Right Answers and True 
Banality‟, in Michael Brint and William Weaver (eds) Pragmatism in Law and Society, (Boulder: 
Westview, 1991), especially 360-1 and 366-9, and also Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (London: 
Penguin, 1999) 93-4.  
73
  Rorty, Social Hope, above n 72, at 248.  
74
  A view which she has projected into her writings on the global condition of women. See, for 
example, Sex and Social Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 86-101, recasting the 
narrower conception of international human rights as „capability‟ rights. 
75
  Nussbaum, Humanity, above n 43, at 215-21. 
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different from us‟.76  And it is not, as Nussbaum added, a new insight.77 The best 
judge and the best lawyer is someone who recognises that their „mission‟ is poetic; 
not just one of applying rules, but also of promoting a liberal jurisprudence of 
„imagination, inclusion, sympathy and voice‟.78 In like tones, Rorty confirms that if 
morality „is thought of neither as a matter of applying the moral law nor the 
acquisition of virtues, but as fellow feeling, the ability to sympathize with the plight 
of others‟, then it seems likely that „the emergence of a human rights culture seems to 
owe nothing to increased moral knowledge, and everything to hearing sad and 
sentimental stories‟.79 Instead of seeking to proclaim something called the „truth‟, the 
Rortian liberal humanist prefers to „keep space open for the sense of wonder which 
poets can sometimes cause‟.80 She knows that „redemption‟ will be found, not in the 
discerning of grand meta-narratives, but in widening the bounds of the „human 
imagination‟.81  
 
Nussbaum‟s substantive critique of pornography and legal regulation is 
framed by this ethical vision, of deploying an ethics of compassion and trust, as 
opposed to a dogma of visceral „rage‟ in order to address real experiences of 
injustice.
82
 More particularly, a humanist jurisprudence, „concerned‟ with nurturing a 
„sympathetic understanding‟ of the „real harms‟ suffered by women, is centrally 
concerned with the issues of „dignity‟ and „objectification‟. Pornography can 
objectify, suggests Nussbaum. It can deny the essential respect for difference which a 
liberal humanist cherishes above all else.
83
 Deploying a familiar Kantian 
conceptualisation, pornography habitually reduces women to means rather than „ends-
in-themselves‟, and the resultant harm, as Nussbaum is quick to affirm, is not merely 
cognitive but deeply emotional too.
84
 Legal proscription, Nussbaum readily agrees, is 
always difficult for a liberal jurist. And the prospective proscription of pornography is 
no exception.
85
 But it is here, at the point of systematic objectification and 
degradation, that the law must intervene, not as in the past in order to assuage a 
masculine fear of female sexuality, but because the failure to do so reinforces the 
                                                 
76
  Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1995), xvi. 
77
  It is for this reason that Nussbaum discusses Adam Smith‟s A Theory of Moral Sentiments in 
some depth in chapter 14 of Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, arguing, quite rightly, that his 
determination to impress the place of emotions in liberal jurisprudence is rooted in the residual 
influence of an Aristotelian conception of the good. It is, as Nussbaum stresses, notable that the 
supposed champion of neo-liberal free market economics should have been so keen to impress the 
value of such a philosophy. 
78
  Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, above n 76, at 119-20. 
79
  See Rorty, Truth, above n  69, at 172 and also Rorty, Social Hope, above  n 72, at 249, 
echoing the statement made in Contingency, above n 68, at xv. 
80
  Rorty, Mirror, above n 68, at 370 and 372. 
81
  Rirchard Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 94, and also 96, 1010-3. See also Social Hope, above n 72, at 262-3. 
82
  In chapter nine of Sex, above n 74, Nussbaum distinguishes „prophets‟ from „philosophers‟, on 
precisely these terms. The former prefers a violence of argument against the merits of reason. At 251, 
she explicitly decries the „fire and brimstone‟ rhetoric which tends to pervade feminist fundamentalism, 
and which maintains „no such space for reconciliation, no positive vision‟. For the invocation of trust 
and sympathy as an alternative to rage, see Sex, above n 74, at 14. 
83
  Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 62. 
84
  See Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 57-8, 73-4, and 224-7. This Kantian anxiety has also been 
noted by Laurie Shrage, above n 38, at 45-51 in particular. 
85
  See Sex, above n 74, at 23 and again at 246. 
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species of „cultural sadism‟ which, according to the likes of Susan Easton, is 
characteristic of so much liberal fundamentalist jurisprudence.
86
 
 
The grand myth of liberal fundamentalism pretends that the interest of all lies 
in the maximum liberty of all. In reality, however, the liberty of some always shapes 
the subjection of others.
87
 Fundamentalist conceptions of liberty, as Mill admitted, are 
easily „deformed‟.88 Choices have to be proscribed, just as regulatory strategies must 
equally be context-specific. Objectification of the female body may well harm in 
certain contexts; in others it may not.
89
 In some instances it may need to be  
proscribed; as most obviously in the case of child abuse images, or in principle at 
least, extreme violence. In others it may not. It is for this reason that we can accept 
depictions of female sexuality in texts such as Lawrence‟s Lady Chatterley’s Lover or 
Henry James‟s The Golden Bowl, whilst expressing rather greater doubt as we turn the 
pages of Playboy or peruse rapedbitch.com.
90
 Whilst the former, as Nussbaum argues, 
can be defended in terms of a capacity to liberate an erotic female experience, to 
promote emotional growth perhaps, the latter, which seeks merely to degrade and to 
silence, cannot.
91
 In both text and reality, what matters is the „overall context of the 
human relationship‟.92 The „salient issue‟ is the degree of „harm, humiliation and 
subordination‟.93 If the imagery prefers the infliction of violence on the powerless, the 
relationship is abusive. It seeks to deny the dignity and humanity of the violated, and 
should be proscribed regardless of notional rights of „free‟ expression.94 Legal 
regulation is here justified.
95
 Indeed, in a liberal society which sets itself against the 
cultural defence of such abuse it is demanded.
96
  
 
The concern with specificity is the third defining characteristic of a liberal 
humanism. The idea of „practical wisdom‟, as we have already noted, is primarily 
                                                 
86
  See Easton, above n 51, at 25-7, and also Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 56 and also Hiding 
from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 137-9. 
87
  For arguments along these lines, see Stephen Gardbaum, „Why the Liberal State can Promote 
Moral Ideas After All‟ (1991) 104 Harvard Law Review 1350, Shrage, above n 39, especially at 58-64, 
and also, at a slight variance, Leslie Green, „Pornographies‟ (2000) 8 Journal of Political Philosophy 
27. 
88
  See Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 149. 
89
  The same view, again based on a reading of Kant, is taken by Shrage, above n 38 at 54, 57-8. 
90
  For Nussbaum‟s particular discussion of Lawrence, James and Playboy, alongside Alan 
Hollinghurst‟s The Swimming-Pool Library, see Sex, above n 74, chapter 8. For reference to 
pornographic rape websites, see McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6 at 686. 
91
  Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 223-4. 
92
  Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 227 and again at 233. 
93
  Nussbaum, Hiding, above n 86, at 143. 
94
  Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 238-9. For a critical commentary on Nussbaum‟s invocation of 
Kantian instrumentality, here, see Green, „Pornographies‟, above n 87, at 44-5. Green suggests that 
Nussbaum is mistaken in assuming that there should always be a prohibition on treating people as 
means. „What is forbidden‟, he argues, is „to treat them merely as means‟. This is correct. But it is also 
precisely what Nussbaum anyway argues, when she denies that instrumentality will always demand 
regulation. 
95
  In her more recent, Hiding from Humanity, above n 86, at 144-6, Nussbaum explicitly 
approves and recommends the recasting of German criminal law in terms of „dignity, subordination and 
objectification‟.  This argument is strongly affirmed by Laurie Shrage, above n 38, at 59-64, for whom 
the promotion of „real violence‟ is the key issue. 
96
  See her concluding comments, on the moral responsibility to address actions which engender 
„rage‟ against injustice, in Hiding, above n 86, at 139 and again at 146-7. 
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geared by a desire to address real harms and injustices in a liberal community.
97
 
According to Nussbaum, therefore, a pragmatic feminist jurisprudence should be 
above all concerned with ensuring that women have enough to eat, that they can walk 
the streets in safety, and should not be compelled to suffer the agonies of genital 
mutilation.
98
 Again, it is for this reason that Nussbaum is so keen to recommend a 
poetic jurisprudence. Literature thrives on human particularity, on „complexity‟, the 
„flawed and imperfect‟.99 It helps reconcile us to chance, „to be bewildered‟ even, to 
„wait and float and be actively passive‟.100 It encourages us to translate our „narrative 
emotions‟ into our more immediately political or jurisprudential „imagination‟.101 It 
also demands that we embrace a critical contingency in our politics; the appreciation 
 
that there is after all more joy in the kind of citizenship that questions than in the kind that 
simply applauds, more fascination in the study of human beings in all their real variety and 
complexity than in the zealous pursuit of superficial stereotypes, more genuine love and 
friendship in the life of questioning and self-government than in submission to authority.
102
 
 
Such an embrace is, of course, just as central to Rorty‟s pragmatic politics. As 
he confirmed in his later Philosophy and Social Hope: 
 
[T]o us pragmatists moral struggle is continuous with the struggle for existence, and no sharp 
break divides the unjust from the imprudent, the evil from the inexpedient. What matters for 
pragmatists is devising ways of diminishing human suffering and increasing human equality, 
increasing the ability of all human children to start life with an equal chance of happiness. 
This goal is not written in the stars, and is no more an expression of what Kant called „pure 
practical reason‟ than it is the will of God. It is a cause worth dying for, but it does not require 
backup from supernatural forces.
103
 
 
Truth, understood as nothing more than a construct of „shared convictions‟, is shaped 
only by the process of „conversation‟ and the „contingencies‟ of time and context.104 
Rorty repeatedly invoked a Deweyan idea of democratic „solidarity‟, a determination 
to give priority to the pragmatics of „helping people solve problems‟, and to broaden 
as far as possible our sense of who might be part of „us‟.105  
 
In contrast with Nussbaum, Rorty only briefly touched on the issue of 
pornography as part of his broader critique of MacKinnon in his 1992 Tanner 
Lecture.
106
 But it is not difficult to flesh out the position of a Rortian pragmatist. S/he 
                                                 
97
  Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, at 43-4 and 72-3, citing Aristotle, Ethics, 1141b8-
16. Such wisdom is „not concerned with universals only; it must also take cognizance of particulars, 
because it is concerned with conduct, and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances‟, in 
Aristotle, Ethics, (London: Penguin, 976), 212. 
98
  Nussbaum, Sex, above n 74, at 5-6, 9-10, 20. 
99
  See Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, at 3, 148, 159, and also Humanity, above n 43, 
at 102-4. 
100
  Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, at 184. 
101
  Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, above n 63, at 294-7. 
102
  Nussbaum, Humanity, above n 43, at 84. 
103
  Rorty, Social Hope, above n 72, at xxix and 178 and also in Contingency, above n 67, at 189. 
104
  See Rorty, Contingency, above n 67, at xv, 4-5, 84-5 and also Consequences, above n 68, at 
165-6. Alan Malachowski puts it pithily: the liberal ironist is someone prepared to become „firm 
friends‟ with chance. See his Rorty, above n 68, at 99. 
105
  See Rorty, Consequences, above n 68, at 53 and 60, and also Contingency, above n 67, at 192. 
106
  The Lecture, entitled „Feminism and Pragmatism‟ is published as chapter 11 of Truth and 
Progress, above n 69. 
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will certainly have little time for those who peddle the insinuation that the 
proscription of pornography might have a „chilling effect‟ on some sort of allusive 
„right‟ of free speech. Neither will she fall prey to the juristic miasma of causal harm. 
The pragmatics of making life better should never be sacrificed on the altar of juristic 
abstraction. It was for this reason that Rorty, whilst wary of its fundamentalist 
tendencies, was so supportive of MacKinnon‟s work.107 Urging a critical affinity, 
founded on their common contempt for „representational accounts of knowledge‟, 
Rorty suggested that ironic pragmatists and radical feminists shared a common 
determination to engage real instances of injustice and suffering.
108
 Approvingly, he 
concluded:   
 
We are not saying that the voice in which women will some day speak will be better at 
representing reality than present-day masculinist discourse… We are just trying to help 
women out of the traps men have constructed for them, help them get the power they presently 
do not have, and help them create a moral identity for women.
109
 
 
The suggestion that women might „only now‟ be in the „process of achieving a 
moral identity as women‟ did not, of course, speak to some kind of epistemological 
discovery.
110
 Rather, as a result of political strategies designed to generate public 
„revulsion and rage‟ women are re-writing their historically prescribed social and 
moral condition.
111
 Armed with the knowledge that no aspect of this condition is set 
in epistemological stone, those concerned with refining this narrative process should 
feel empowered to continue their argument against misogyny, degradation and de-
humanization, whether or not expressed in pornographic form.
112
 It is not, moreover, 
just a matter of having the confidence to do so. It is also a matter of having a 
responsibility to do so.
113
 The regulation of pornography is subject to the same „law‟ 
of history which Hegel uncovered; what one generation thinks is beyond argument, 
the next generation argues about, and the next generation to come, as often as not, re-
writes.
114
 
 
3. Proscription: Muddling Through 
 
The pornography debate, of course, has a long history of writing and re-writing. 
Judicial pronouncements on the subject of obscenity can be found scattered across 
eighteenth century court reports. The Victorians were obsessed with pornography. 
                                                 
107
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 215. 
108
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 202-3, 206-7. 
109
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 210. 
110
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 219-20, emphasising that such a supposition is very much the 
product of historical contingency: „For a woman to say that she finds her moral identity in being a 
woman would have sounded, until recently, as weird as for a slave to say that he found his moral 
identity in being a slave‟. 
111
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 204. 
112
  Rorty strongly argues for the „narrative‟ form of this re-writing in the Tanner Lecture, in 
Truth, above n 69, at 221-2. 
113
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 227. 
114
  Rorty, Truth, above n 69, at 223-4. It must be admitted that not all feminists were so sanguine 
about the prospects of history. As Joan Williams observed, such poetic optimism was all very nice. But 
it threatens a distraction not altogether dissimilar from that of the liberal fundamentalist fetish for 
rights. Too much whimsy can „deflect‟ our „gaze from ingrained patterns of gender, class and race 
inequities‟: quoted in Ian Ward, „Bricolage and Low Cunning: Rorty on Pragmatism, Politics and 
Poetic Justice‟ (2008) 28 Legal Studies 281, at 301. 
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The successive Wolfenden and Williams Commissions during the latter decades of 
the twentieth century testified to a continuing political interest in such questions. The 
latter‟s Report on obscenity famously preferred a liberal fundamentalist position, 
deploying a crude version of Mill‟s Harm Principle, and presuming a utilitarian 
rationale for either recommending regulation or not. It concluded that those who 
worried about the impact of pornography on society had got the „problem‟ out of 
„proportion‟.115 For much of the two decades which followed, anti-pornography 
campaigns in the UK tended to be piecemeal, often the playthings of individual 
Members of Parliament or particular media outlets.
116
 
 
But the debate also has a rather shorter history, covering the last four or five 
years, and one which provides the immediate impetus to revisit, and perhaps 
reconceptualise, the case for pornography regulation. Initiating this shorter history 
was the popular and political furore which surrounded the murder conviction of 
Graham Coutts and the subsequent enactment of the extreme pornography provisions 
in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Coutts, it transpired, was a devotee 
of extreme pornography, indulging his taste excessively in the days and hours before 
he murdered Jane Longhurst.
117
 Following his conviction, Jane Longhurst‟s mother, 
Liz, campaigned long and hard for reform, gaining in the process not only the 
signatures of 50,000 supporters, but also the specific approbation of various senior 
government ministers.
118
 The original Government consultation process, initiated in 
2005, indeed made the link between the Longhurst murder and the Government‟s 
proposals explicit.
119
  
 
In the beginning, the consultation process regarding the new proposals was 
notable both for its preparedness to countenance statutory prohibition on some forms 
of pornography, as distinct from existing provisions relating to obscenity and 
indecency, and for its justification on the basis of the possible harm of pornographic 
images of sexual violence. To this latter end, the Government‟s 2005 Consultation 
Paper objected to images of „the torture of (mostly female) victims‟, explicitly 
referring to the need to proscribe „sites featuring violent rape scenes‟.120 It expressed 
concern for those who „participate in the creation of sexual material containing 
violence‟ and defended action on the basis that extreme pornography may „encourage‟ 
                                                 
115
  Report of the Committee on Obscenity and Film Censorship (Chair: Bernard Williams) Cmnd 
7772 (1979) at 95. In the end, the only form of regulation the Commission was prepared to recommend 
related to the zoning and display of sexually explicit material. 
116
  For overviews of developments during this period, see Catherine Itzin, „Introduction‟, in 
Catherine Itzin (ed) Pornography: women, violence and civil liberties – a radical new view (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992) 1-23, and Lynne Segal, „Introduction‟ in Segal and McIntosh, above n 
5, at 1-11.  
117
  At trial it was alleged that Jane Longhurst had been „deliberately murdered in order to satisfy‟ 
Coutts‟s „macabre sexual fantasies and that the murder was the manifestation of his long-standing 
fixation for women who are helpless and being strangled‟: R v Coutts [2005] EWCA 52 (CA) and 
[2006] UKHL 39 (HL).  
118
  Introducing the proposals in the 2007 Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, Home Secretary 
Jacqui Smith noted that the „campaigning of Liz Longhurst‟ had „brought the issue to the fore and 
applied the necessary pressure to bring about legislative changes‟. Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, was 
likewise quick to pay tribute to Liz Longhurst during Parliamentary debates. He hoped that the 
government proposals would „go at least some way to meeting her concerns‟. For Straw‟s comments, 
see Hansard 8/10/2007, col.60. For Smith‟s see 9/7/2008, col.1179. 
119
  See McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6, at 679. 
120
  See McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6, at 679. 
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interest in violent sexual activity.
121
 To meet these concerns, the Government 
proposed a new offence criminalizing the possession of images of „extreme 
pornography‟, a term designed to encompass bestiality, necrophilia and „serious 
sexual violence and serious violence in a sexual context‟. This new offence would 
supplement the existing Obscene Publications Act 1959 which only criminalises the 
production and dissemination of „obscene‟ materials.  
 
Instantly, the fundamentalist flames were fanned. Liberal fundamentalists 
immediately challenged the proposals, raising the spectre of an „Orwellian victimless 
crime enforced by Thought Police‟.122 Moreover, these „thought police‟ were going to 
be very busy, criminalising the „millions‟ who use the pornographic material to be 
covered.
123
 The Bar Council worried that those who perused images of anal rape in 
video recordings of Howard Brenton‟s Romans in Britain might find themselves up 
before the Bench.
124
 Of course, such a recording would never come within the scope 
of the measures, not being explicit, or pornographic or involving life-threatening or 
serious injury.
125
 But as the debate heated up, common-sense melted away. Julian 
Petley lamented the prevalence of „over-heated language‟, the fact that in these 
debates „sheer assertion takes the place of rational argument‟. The fault was obvious: 
anti-pornography feminists are „not exactly people with open minds on the subject of 
pornography‟.126 The proposed legislation, Petley advised, „puts nanny firmly into 
jackboots‟. And the Government, clearly, is „happy‟ to align itself with the regimes of 
„Saudi Arabia, China and South Korea‟, he concluded portentously; overcome at the 
last, it seemed, by the irresistible urge to „sheer‟, and ever more absurd, „assertion‟.127  
                                                 
121
  Home Office, Consultation: On the Possession of Extreme Pornographic Material (London: 
Home Office, 2005), at 2 and paras 34 and 27.  
122
  The Campaign Against Censorship, quoted in McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6 at 677-678. 
The vast majority of responses to the 2005 consultation are available at: 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/law/research/politicsofporn/responses/ [last visited 26 February 2009].  
123
  As suggested by the group „backlash‟ which was formed to fight the proposals. See  
http://www.backlash-uk.org.uk/dhDurham.html [last visited 26 February 2009]. 
124
  Bar Council, above n 122, and discussed in McGlynn and Rackley, above n 6 at 684-685. 
125
  The (mis)use of similar examples can already been seen in the Scottish debates over similar 
measures, with one Scottish MSP dissembling about images of Shakespeare being threatened. (Such 
images would not be covered as they would not be explicit or pornographic.) See David Mattox, „Art 
will suffer under porn ban, warns MSP‟, The Scotsman, 20 January 2009, available at 
http://news.scotsman.com/politics/Art-will-suffer-under-.4892027.jp [last visited 26 February 2009]. 
See also Michael Howie, „Jail for Downloading Extreme Pornography‟, The Scotsman, 19 January 
2009, available at: http://news.scotsman.com/latestnews/Jail-for-downloading-39extreme39-
sex.4888459.jp [last visited 26 February 2009]. 
126
  See Julian Petley, „Extreme Ignorance‟, Index on Censorship 26 June 2007, available at: 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2007/06/26/extreme-ignorance/ and „Britain: matters of decency‟, 
Index on Censorship, 18 January 2008, available at: 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2008/01/18/britain-matters-of-decency/ [both last visited 26 
February 2009]. He went on to describe the proposals‟ supporters as „apocalyptic (individuals), 
dogmatic and intellectually dubious (certain women‟s groups) and downright authoritarian (the 
police)‟. This was in apparent contrast to the „extraordinarily well-informed and cogently argued‟ 
responses against the proposals: see http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/3556/ [last 
visited 28 February 2009]. 
127
  See Julian Petley, „Legislating in Haste‟, Index on Censorship, 11 March 2008, 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2008/03/11/legislating-in-haste/ and „Extreme Ignorance‟, Index on 
Censorship, 26 June 2007, available at: http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2007/06/26/extreme-
ignorance/ and „Britain: matters of decency‟, Index on Censorship, 18 January 2008, available at: 
http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2008/01/18/britain-matters-of-decency/ [all last visited 26 February 
2009]. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, feminist responses to the Government proposals were 
rather more supportive, even if many bemoaned their restricted scope.
128
 Justice for 
Women quoted Andrea Dworkin‟s argument that „pornography is violence against 
women, violence which pervades and distorts every aspect of our culture‟.129 Pressing 
a more radical alternative, one feminist group explicitly advocated the adoption of the 
MacKinnon/Dworkin Ordinances, whilst another suggested that the definition of 
pornography be based around the idea of „subordinating‟ material.130 A determination 
to progress beyond the aspirant proscriptions of 1980s/1990s feminist was striking. 
The organisation Lilith, supported by the Women‟s National Commission, proposed a 
definition of „extreme pornography‟ which included any material depicting women‟s 
„bodies being abused in any way‟, extending to images which are „hostile to women 
by showing them in passive roles in sexual activity or being dominated‟ and „any 
material which features naked women for the sole purpose of sexual gratification‟.131 
Such an expansive definition reaches far beyond MacKinnon and Dworkin‟s „sexually 
explicit subordination of women‟; to include images for the purposes of sexual 
arousal of any naked women. Another feminist group advocated inclusion of „the 
written text as well as visual imagery‟.132 
 
Moral fundamentalists reacted just as strongly to the proposals. Mediawatch-
uk reaffirmed that all pornography, because of its „casual, immoral and responsibility-
free approach to sexuality, contributes significantly to the social problems of sexual 
dysfunction, the continually rising rates of sexually transmitted infections, the 
increasing rate of marital breakdown and the annually rising sexual crime rate‟. It also 
„encourages a distorted attitude to human sexuality‟.133 The Conservative Party 
expressed its concern over images which are „deeply depraved and corrupting‟.134 The 
Lawyers‟ Christian Fellowship maintained that all pornography „encourages a 
distorted and selfish view of sexuality‟ which „divorces sex from love and tenderness‟ 
and demanded sex education which focuses on „sex in a positive way, emphasising 
that it finds it proper and most fulfilling place within a marriage between a man and a 
woman‟.135 A number of police forces responded in similar fashion. The Kent 
constabulary argued for an extension to cover written material, whilst their colleagues 
in the West Midlands voiced a peculiar concern about images which might depict the 
„eating of faeces or urine‟.136  
 
It was readily apparent that tempers would again be high, that argument would 
veer toward the extremes and that easy accommodation would be impossible. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, the Government‟s amended proposals presented in 2006 evidenced a 
                                                 
128
  Feminists Against Censorship, equally unsurprisingly, represented the only significant 
feminist exception to the broadly supportive reception. 
129
  Justice for Women, above n 122.  
130
  Respectively, Justice for Women and the pressure group Object, above n 122 
131
  Lilith, above n 122. 
132
  Wearside Women in Need, above n 122. 
133
  Mediawatch-uk, response available at:  
http://www.mediawatchuk.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=238&Itemid=124 
[last visited 26 February 2009].  
134
  Conservative Party, above n 122. 
135
  Lawyers‟ Christian Fellowship, above n 122. 
136
  Both responses available at n 122. 
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growing temerity.
137
 The idea of criminalizing images of sexual violence was 
superseded by a concern with pornographic acts of „serious violence‟ alone. Such 
„serious‟ images, it was now proposed, would have to „appear to be life threatening‟ 
or „likely to result in serious, disabling injury‟. Such stipulations, most obviously the 
insertion of a criterion of apparent „injury‟, were clearly intended to lend a little 
definitional veracity. But they were also limiting. Rape referents were erased; even 
though independently commissioned research for the Ministry of Justice concluded 
that the link between pornography and rape was demonstrable.
138
 By the time the draft 
Bill was published a year later, the provisions were further restricted in scope, now 
only covering images of an act which „threatens or appears to threaten a person‟s life‟ 
or „an act which results in or appears to result (or be likely to result) in serious injury 
to a person‟s anus, breasts or genitals‟.139 By the time the legislation received Royal 
Assent, yet another threshold had been inserted, namely that the „extreme image‟ must 
also be one which is „grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene 
character‟.140 Much had changed in three years.141 
 
Clearly the ferocity of the debate caught the Government by surprise. Liberty 
castigated the „carelessly drafted, over-broad‟ language of the statute; the sort of 
criticisms which can only explain the Government‟s oddly precise physiological 
enunciation of „anus, breasts or genitals‟.142 Moral fundamentalists were to be sated 
with the statutory instantiation of the terms „disgusting‟, „obscene‟ and „grossly 
offensive‟; a new target for creative debate and interpretation. Least effective in the 
fight over statutory language, it appears, were the anti-pornography feminists. An 
immediate absurdity inherent in the new measures is that while the possession of 
pornographic images of intercourse or oral sex with animals is criminalized, this is not 
the case for all pornographic images of sexual violence. Most particularly, to all 
intents and purposes, pornographic rape images will not now come within the scope 
of the measures.
143
 The failure to include such paradigmatic images of sexual violence 
                                                 
137
  Home Office, Consultation on the Possession of Extreme Pornographic Material – summary 
of responses and next steps (London: Home Office, 2006).  
138
  Above n 30. The report itself has been subject to detailed criticism for its methodology and 
conclusions. The principal point here, however, is the dissonance between the Government‟s use of this 
report to justify its proposals which by and large exclude images of rape, and the fact that the report 
largely relies on studies considering the effect of pornographic images of rape to reach its conclusions. 
139
  It further sought to criminalize images of necrophilia and of sexual activity with animals. For 
a brief discussion of the proposals in the 2007 Bill, see Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, „The 
Politics of Porn‟ (2007) New Law Journal 1142-1143. 
140
  Section 63(6)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
141
  For a detailed analysis of the measures as enacted, see Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, 
„Criminalising Extreme Pornography: A Lost Opportunity‟ [2009] Criminal Law Review 245. 
142
  Liberty, Liberty’s Second Reading Briefing on the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill in 
the House of Lords, January 2008, para 25, available at: http://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/publications/pdfs/criminal-justice-and-immigration-bill-2nd-reading-lords.pdf [last visited 
26 February 2009]. The specification of „anus, breasts or genitals‟ evidences the lack of understanding 
that the harm of extreme pornography is not simply that of violence against specific body parts.  
143
  Depictions of rape which are life-threatening or which involve serious injury to the anus or 
genitals will fall within the scope of the measures, but this excludes all other, indeed the vast majority, 
of rapes. See further McGlynn and Rackley, „Lost Opportunity‟, above n 141, at 249-250. This is a 
lacuna set to be rectified in the Scottish measures on extreme pornography which, as currently 
proposed, are to include images of „rape and other non- consensual penetrative sexual activity, whether 
violent or otherwise‟: see Scottish Executive, Revitalising Justice - Proposals To Modernise And 
Improve The Criminal Justice System, 25 September 2008, available at:    
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/09/24132838/0 [last visited 26 February 2009]. 
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says much about the progress of debate and negotiation. It further confirms that, for 
all the Government‟s warm words in the initial consultation, it feared the 
disapprobation of the liberal and moral fundamentalists rather more than that of the 
anti-pornography feminists.  
 
At this point, the liberal humanist may be disappointed, but not too surprised. 
The disappointment is rooted in the knowledge that the existence of internet sites 
which trade under the nomenclature rapepassion.com or rapedbitch.com add nothing 
to the cause of human dignity, or indeed make our society a kinder, more 
compassionate or more human place. It is confirmed by the realisation that the new 
provisions will add little to the regulation of such sites, or the posting or downloading 
of images of a violent sexual nature, that they fall well short of the kind of 
proscription which might have been reasonably expected, at least in a society which 
presumes to set itself against the glorification of misogyny. And s/he will wonder 
why. There is no pretension to art here, no attempt to explore the deeper emotional 
reaches of human engagement. It is hardly likely that internet providers would have 
successfully pressed a Convention right. And to suggest that criminalizing the 
possession of such images might have a „chilling‟ effect on so-called „rights‟ of free 
expression stretches credence. No such absolute rights exist in practice; at least not in 
the real world. And to repeat Stanley Fish‟s famous aside, to which the liberal 
humanist would nod vigorously, it is a good thing too.
144
 As Cass Sunstein rightly 
argued long ago, some speech is „high-value‟ and some is „low-value‟.145 The screams 
of pain and misery which tend to accompany images of extreme pornography fall into 
the latter category.   
 
The concern for practicality, for addressing real harms and real injustices, will 
confirm this sense of regret. Not only would little to be lost by the closer proscription 
of sites such as rapedbitch.com, or any of the others which the likes of Graham Coutts 
find so addictive, but so too would there be much to be gained. Regulation of such 
forms of „expression‟ does not need to satisfy the more esoteric demands of moral 
epistemology or abstract jurisprudence. Sense, understood as an expression of 
practical reason, and human sensitivity, the twin constituents of what Nussbaum terms 
an „intelligent‟ liberalism, is enough.146 The „harms‟ of extreme pornography are not 
located in any comprehensive theory; and they do not need to be. They are, instead, 
expressed in a violence that is politically constructed and culturally embedded.
147
 A 
society that really aspires to be compassionate, that wishes to do more than simply 
pay lip-service to the idea of justice, will address such harms undeterred by the 
abstruse distractions of the liberal fundamentalist.  
 
At the same time, this pragmatic bent of the liberal humanist furnishes at least 
some consolation, even reconciliation, from the inroads that have been made. The 
sheer existence and prevalence of extreme pornography is now a part of public 
                                                 
144
  See, Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and Its a Good Thing Too (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), particularly 111-15. 
145
  The importance of liberals recognising the pragmatic necessity of distinguishing „low-value‟ 
and „high-value‟ speech is strongly made by Sunstein, above n 32, at 602-9 and also 616-18. For 
similar observations see also Scoccia, above n 57, at 795-9. 
146
  See Nussbaum, Humanity, above n 43, at 10-11, and Rorty, Contingency, above n 67, at 176-
7. Susan Easton urges a similar justification, above n 51, at 16-17. 
147
  For more on the concept of „cultural harm‟ as a justification for pornography regulation, see 
McGlynn and Rackley, „Lost Opportunity‟, above n 141, at 256-259. 
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knowledge, and public debate. The use of such materials has been challenged; 
responsibility has been broadened to include not only those who produce and 
disseminate extreme pornography, but also those who access and use it, who feed the 
trade. Some may be deterred, some may be prosecuted. Perhaps more importantly 
public consciousness about the cultural harm of extreme pornography will be raised.  
 
And so, leaving the bickering fundamentalists to their endless squabbles, the 
statutory drafters to their agonies of imprecision, and the politicians to their wild 
oscillations between rhetorical rage and legislative temerity, the liberal humanist 
simply moves on. Rather than trying to make people more virtuous, or better aware of 
their supposed rights, or possessed of a more acute perception of the difference 
between eroticism and pornography, s/he prefers to get on with the business of 
addressing the various little „contingencies‟ that make the lives of those with whom 
s/he lives that little bit more, or that little bit less, edifying.
148
 The primary 
responsibility here, as both Nussbaum and Rorty repeatedly urge, is to „help‟ real 
people resolve „real problems‟.149 The continued existence of internet sites such as 
rapedbitch.com is a problem. The violence inflicted upon women such as Jane 
Longhurst is all too real. There is much still to be done. And much that can be done. 
The liberal humanist jurist knows that law is anyway a limited instrument; often 
useful, rarely sufficient.
150
 Exorcising extreme pornography will require 
complementary economic and cultural strategies, perhaps punitive tax regimes or civil 
ordinances indeed, educational programs certainly. It will take time.  
 
And more debate, much more; for the liberal humanist also knows that the 
conversation will continue, as it always does. And s/he cherishes this thought; not 
least because it further leavens the immediate sense of disappointment. Of course the 
measures which finally crept onto the statute book in the 2008 Act disappoint, a pale 
imitation of the original draft provisions presented three years ago. In their present 
form they will probably not save the next Jane Longhurst, anymore than they will 
deter the next Graham Coutts. But they represent another stage in a particular history 
that is constantly in the writing.
151
 This is how a liberal democracy operates, 
inherently agonistic, the construct of myriad conversations and debates, all organic, 
all ongoing.
152
 It makes progress by „muddling through‟, and is happy to do so, not 
because it is preferable to any other mode of operation, but because it is the only 
mode of operation.
153
 Progress, it might be said of the 2008 provisions, has been 
                                                 
148
  See Rorty, Consequences, above n 68, at 165-6, 189, discussing the idea of a politics as a 
matter of resolving „contingencies‟, and also Mirror, above n 68, at 370-2, for the liberal pragmatist‟s 
primary responsibility for enhancing that which „edifies‟ our lives. 
149
  See Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, above n 68, at 79 and also Nussbaum, Sex, above 
n 74, at 5-6, 9-10, explicitly recommending the greater need to address the „real‟ harms that women 
suffer in their daily lives. 
150
  Nussbaum, Poetic Justice, above n 76, at 119-20. For an acute appreciation of the need to 
remain aware of law‟s limitations, see also Jackson, above n 2, at 68-9, hazarding the thought: „Perhaps 
the time has come to admit that the law cannot reverse a cultural obsession with sex by addressing one 
extreme means by which this obsession is expressed‟. 
151
  Rorty, Philosophy as Cultural Politics, above n 68, at ix. 
152
  See Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1998) 24-5 and 30, discussing democratic politics as a „poetic agon, in which jarring dialectical 
discords‟ will be „resolved in previously unheard harmonies‟. 
153
  Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) 43. For a fuller discussion as to the consequences of Rorty‟s concession here, see Ward, above n 
114, at 302-3.  
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slight. But progress there is all the same. And next time, we might do that little bit 
better still; maybe even a lot better. In the meantime we can try to conceive of ways to 
make the lives of the Graham Coutts of the world that little bit harder, and in so doing 
make the lives of the countless of thousands of women upon whom they prey that 
little bit happier perhaps, and that little bit safer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
